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Abstract
Regulation of television advertising typically covers both the time de-
voted to commercials and restrictions on the commodities or services that
can be publicized to various audiences (stricter laws often apply to chil-
dren’s programming). Time restrictions (advertising caps) may improve
welfare when advertising is overprovided in the market system. Even
then, such caps may reduce the diversity of programming by curtailing
revenues from programs. They may also decrease program net quality
(including the direct beneﬁt to viewers). Restricting advertising of par-
ticular products (such as cigarettes) likely reﬂects paternalistic altruism,
but restrictions may be less eﬃcient than appropriate taxes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most nations restrict the advertisements that are broadcast on television. There
are restrictions on both the length of commercial breaks, and on the content of
the advertisements themselves. This paper is concerned with the economic ra-
tionale underlying such regulations. Examples of type of regulatory constraints
on advertising broadcast on television are drawn from Europe, the United States,
and, most prominently, from Australia. The Australian case is particularly use-
ful because the regulations are clearly set forth in oﬃcial publications. Many
of the regulations in Australia have counterparts in other nations.
Length restrictions are widespread in developed nations with the conspicuous
exception of the lack of US restrictions (the US does not restrict the broadcast-
ing of commercials, except during children’s programming). Understanding the
economic rationale for length restrictions requires ﬁrst understanding the com-
plex interactions in the market for television advertisements. The main players
in the market are the advertisers, the television viewers, and the broadcasters
who coordinate the two sides of the market. Advertisers want to communicate
with viewers, who are the prospective consumers of the products touted in the
ads. Viewers want to enjoy the program content, and “pay” for it through
being exposed to the advertisements. Broadcasters must balance the revenues
earned from delivering eyeballs to advertisers with the distaste to ads that view-
ers express by switching oﬀ or switching over. A broadcaster’s calculus does
not fully internalize the net social costs of ads (viewer distaste minus advertiser
surplus), and broadcasters are also able to exploit market power in delivering
viewers to advertisers. Furthermore, the private demand for advertisements
may exceed or fall short of the social demand, depending on the type and role
of advertising (or, indeed, one’s view thereof). This means that the unregulated
broadcast market can involve too much or too little advertising. The case for
advertising caps revolves around there being excessive advertising in a market
system.
Length restrictions are socially harmful if there is under-advertising, where
the term under-advertising is used to denote less advertising than would be so-
cially optimal. Under-advertising may arise if nuisance costs to viewers are
relatively low, and if the social beneﬁts (from informing viewers of socially valu-
able transaction opportunities, for example) are high. On the other hand, length
restrictions may be beneﬁcial if it can be argued that the market system leads to
excessive advertising. Such over-advertising is likely if the nuisance to viewers
is large relative to the beneﬁts to advertisers. The beneﬁts to advertisers may
in turn overstate the social beneﬁts from advertising (although the converse is
also possible). However, a simple study of whether there is too much or too
little advertising, taking as given the existing market parameters may seriously
misread the full economic eﬀects of advertising length caps. Indeed, advertis-
ing caps may reduce program quality, the breadth of programming, and overall
choice diversity by reducing the proﬁtability to broadcasters of producing pro-
gramming. These factors need to be incorporated too into the evaluation of
the desirability of regulations.
2Advertising content restrictions are also widespread in developed nations.
Many countries ban or restrict the advertising of certain products. These can
mostly be understood as being demerit goods (like tobacco, liquor, and gam-
bling). The argument for banning advertising of such goods reﬂects paternalis-
tic concerns about the consumption of these goods. The goods themselves are
frequently heavily taxed. One question here is why the ads themselves could not
b et a x e di n s t e a d ,o rp e r h a p st h ep r o d u c t sm i g h tb et a x e de v e nm o r eh e a v i l y .
In response, one might argue that it might seem to be rather hypocritical (or
counter-productive eﬀect at any rate) if a cigarette advert were followed by an
anti-smoking ad ﬁnanced by the revenues from the previous ad or the advertised
product. So it is that several commodities cannot be legally advertised, and con-
sumers are protected from harmful products that advertising might otherwise
glamorize or indeed make consumers more aware of consumption possibilities.
This type of consumer protection is taken further when it comes to children’s
advertising. Regulations in this area are even stricter, and some countries com-
pletely ban advertisements during programming aimed at children, or even ads
using characters from children’s programming. Here, presumably, the view is
that children are not able to make fully rational consumption decisions them-
selves, either through limited information, or through limited decision-making
capacity. Advertisements may put undue pressure on parents to purchase prod-
ucts the parents might otherwise deem not in the best interests of their oﬀspring
(rather like the signs in some supermarkets that indicate certain check-out lanes
where candy is not on display). Knowing that children are not subverted by ad-
vertising messages may reassure parents to allow television-watching privileges.
One might view the paternalism inherent in banning cigarette advertising to
adults as rather similar, with some manipulable consumers being (somewhat)
protected from making bad consumption decisions.
The converse case to demerit goods is illustrated by the fact that many
countries require stations to carry certain public service announcements (PSAs)
as well as party political broadcasts in election season. One might view these
as merit commodities that are encouraged by the government with an implicit
subsidy to their promotion. Another related type of regulation in the television
context is local content - for example, some European countries restrict the
amount of material broadcast of foreign origin.
There may be perverse economic eﬀects in the industry sectors that are
aﬀected by restrictions or banning (although it seems unlikely that such eﬀects in
practice do underlie actual restrictions). For example, drawing on the economics
of advertising, it is conceivable that an advertising ban might even raise industry
proﬁts. This outcome might transpire if an unrestricted outcome would involve
much advertising that served mainly to shuﬄe demand among producers. An
interesting and controversial case in its own right is that of Direct To Consumer
Advertising of prescription drugs. Only two nations allow such advertising,
and it is arguable that it leads to overprescribing of drugs. Counterarguments
include that consumers are better informed, and may be better induced to get
treatment once they know of potential cures for maladies suﬀered.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. The next section
3describes the regulations for Australia in more detail, and also gives details on
EU regulations and selected European countries. Section 3 sets out a model
of advertising caps and discusses the market interaction in television markets
between viewers and advertisers, intermediated by broadcast “platforms.” The
discussion of the basic market form is extended to allow for quality choice and
format competition. Section 4 addresses why certain goods are barred from
being advertised in some countries, and also discusses some possible implications
for the product markets concerned. Section 5 concludes.
2 Regulations and restrictions
In what follows, the Australian case is treated in some detail, followed by short
remarks for salient features from other nations. There is a detailed set of guide-
lines to draw on for Australian television.1 Many of the regulations in Australia
have counterparts in other nations. Australian television is governed by the
Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA). One of the objectives of the ABA
is to promote the development and reﬂection of Australian identity, character,
and cultural diversity through what is broadcast. While the ABA leaves the
primary responsibility for ensuring that broadcasts meet community standards
with the television stations themselves, it also has developed a code of practice
that suggests guidelines as well as some compulsory standards. These include
Australian content and children’s program content.2 They also include restric-
tions on both the length of advertisements (advertising caps) and the content
of advertisements and the types of goods that may be advertised.
2.1 The Australian Broadcast Authorities Code of Prac-
tice
The ABA Code of Practice is intended to regulate the content of commercial
television according to current community standards and ensure that viewers
are helped to make ﬁrm choices about their viewing and that of their chil-
dren. There is quite a complex layer of regulations and publications that
describe the guidelines. The code operates alongside three overlapping au-
thorities. These are ABA standards that regulate programs for children and
sustain Australian content; advertising codes from the Australian Competition
1The July 2004 draft of the Australian “Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice”
is available online at www.freevaust.com.au, and from Free TV Australia, Mosman, NSW
2088, Australia.
2The ABA also has speciﬁc regulations aimed at sports content. First they include an
“anti-siphoning” list that prevents certain sports events from being siphoned oﬀ by pay televi-
sion - this would prevent free-to-air viewers from being able to watch the event. Conversely,
the ABA also enforces free-to-air broadcasters via an anti-hoarding provision that is intended
to discourage them from holding back the live coverage of certain events. Concerns simi-
lar to those that underscored the Australian regulation were also a worry in the European
Union. Hansen and Kyhl (2001) give some background details to the European case, as well
as providing an analysis of the positive and normative economics of pay-per-view broadcasts.
4and Consumer Commission (ACCC) governing the content of television com-
mercials and advertising generally; and the commercial television advisory notes
which respond to cultural diversity, people with disabilities, etc.
There are several requirements in the code concerning television commer-
cials. First, television advertisers are expected to make sure that their ads
comply with both the Advertisers Code of Ethics3 and the code for advertising
for children. The code also sets up restrictions on the amount of advertising
and other program matter that stations may air during the day. There are
also placement restrictions on certain types of “sensitive” advertising. More-
over, commercials must not be too noisy or strident or even sound louder than
adjacent programming, and transmission should not be higher in advertising
breaks.4 In addition, commercials and other promotions5 must be easily distin-
guished by viewers from program material. This is especially important where
children are concerned. There are also guidelines for disclosure of commercial
arrangements, for example, if products or services are endorsed or featured in
the program and such endorsements have been paid for by the sponsoring ﬁrm.
The ABA requires that at least eighty percent of advertising time broadcast
each year between 6am and midnight be used for Australian-produced adver-
tisements.6
Rules on commercials and promotions intend there to be “a reasonable bal-
ance between program and non-program matter broadcast by a licensee.”7 Non-
program matter includes several sub-categories. The most important are spot
commercials, which are deﬁned as advertising for a product service or belief
that is scheduled within a program break or between programs. The second
sub-category comprises advertising that takes the form of superimposed text
occupying all of the screen during the program. The third type is a program
promotion (known as a “tune-in” in the United States) or station promotion.
The code exempts several categories from being non-program matter. These
include a prize, a competition, or an information segment. Another exempted
category includes community service announcements that promote a charitable
cause or activity, and are broadcast free by licensees. Likewise exempted are
3The Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA) was adopted for advertising
self regulation. The intention is to ensure that ads are legal, decent, honest and truthful with
a “fair sense of responsibility to competitors”. In particular, ads should not be misleading or
deceptive, nor likely to be so, and “shall not contain a misrepresentation which is likely to
cause damage to the business or goodwill of a competitor.” Neither should ads portray people
in a discriminatory way (disability, age, sex, ethnicity, etc.) Ads should not present violence,
sex or obscene language unless justiﬁed by context. There is a separate Automotive Code of
Practice that relates to advertising for motor vehicles.
4Casual empiricism regarding radio advertisements for used cars in the US suggest such
standards are not applied in America! Likewise, television commerical breaks in the US are
often noticeably louder than the surrounding programming.
5These include program promotions (“tune-ins”), station promotions, and community ser-
vice announcements.
6Since 1981, New Zealand commercials have fully qualiﬁed as Australian.
7T h ec o d eu s e sa sar e f e r e n c ep o i n tt h ea m o u n to fn o n - p r o g r a mm a t t e ro nt h eF i n a lS c h e d -
ules. These are the last schedules prepared before the broadcast and indicate when breaks are
to be aired and what is aired within the breaks. The idea here is to give ﬂexibility and not
oblige licensees to force breaks in live programs because of unpredicted segment lengths.
5announcements for an election authority, and sponsorship announcements8.I n -
terestingly, infomercials are also excluded. Another way to get an exemption
is to use a voice-over or promotion over the closing credits of another program
or superimposed text over only part of the screen during the program. Various
other announcements and restricted “tune-ins” are exempted. As long as they
contain no more than 10 seconds of program content, these announcements in-
clude those that indicate that a program will not be shown when advertised,
a list of programs to be broadcast that day, a short announcement of the next
p r o g r a m ,a n dam o v i e - o p e n e r( ab r i e fi n t r o d u c t o r ys e q u e n c et oaf e a t u r eﬁlm).
Also permitted are station identiﬁcation, a plot summary at the beginning of an
episode of a series, and a program trailer for a future episode if this is broadcast
before the closing credits.9
Having described what counts as advertising, we now consider the Australian
Rules for Limitations to the number of adverts that may be aired. There are
both average limitations and limitations for particular hours. These are quite
close together in terms of number of minutes (as opposed to the European
context, in which the numbers are quite diﬀerent). In Australia, an average
of thirteen minutes of non-program matter may be broadcast between 6 p.m.
and midnight, and ﬁfteen minutes at other times (excepting in P and C periods
as discussed below). In any particular hour, between 6 p.m. and midnight
up to ﬁfteen minutes maybe broadcast, but no more than fourteen minutes
(average) in any four hours. During election periods, stations can add one
minute of political matter. At all other times, the maximum hourly limit is
sixteen minutes. The two categories of programming that concern children are
P and C periods. No commercials may be broadcast during P periods. In the
C period, each half hour may contain no more than ﬁve minutes of commercials
and one minute of other promotions. Further restrictions on advertising to
children are described below.
Placement of commercials for certain types of goods and services are also re-
stricted. Alcoholic drinks (including beer, wine, and spirits) may be advertised
only in mature and adult time periods. Exceptionally, they may accompany
live broadcasts of sporting events on public holidays and weekends. Commer-
cials for betting and gambling also must only be shown during mature audience
periods although government lotteries, etc., are accepted. Commercials for X-
rated ﬁlms may not be broadcast, and commercials for R-rated ﬁlms only after
8:30 p.m.
Additional regulations concern children. The AANA code for advertising to
children concerns advertising self-regulation towards children of fourteen years
8Sponsorship announcements must make no reference to prices nor last more than 10
seconds per sponsor (with a maximum of 30 seconds).
9Since the types of advertisement exempted (such as tune-ins) are primarily informative,
the economic question is whether informative advertisements can be excessive in equilibrium.
Few economic analyses suggest that information provision may be excessive in a market equi-
librium. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) ﬁnd such a result for oligopolists providing information
about their competing products. Dixit and Norman (1979) also ﬁnd that oligopolists may
over-advertise in the context of persuasive advertising. These issues are discussed in more
detail below.
6or less. Notably, adverts for food and drink should not encourage an inactive
lifestyle nor promote unhealthy eating habits. Also, the host or the character
in the program must not promote products for services. Finally, children’s
television standards must not demean people or groups on the basis of ethnicity
etc., nor must they distress or frighten children, display unsafe situations. Ad-
vertisements to children must not mislead or deceive them and must be clearly
understood by them. Advertising must not cause children to put undue pressure
on their parents to buy goods. They also must not undermine parental author-
ity nor must they imply that a product makes children who own it superior to
their peers or that persons who buy what is advertised are more generous than
those who do not buy such products. Any claims made in advertising must
be clear and truthful. If prices are mentioned, they must be done so accu-
rately. The presentation should not then play down prices by words by using
such qualifying adjectives as “only” or “just”.
2.2 Regulations in European Countries
In Europe, broadcast advertising has been legally controlled via the Television
Without Frontiers Directive enacted by the Council of the European Community
in 1989. The TWF Directive has the purposes of securing access for viewers
and listeners in all Members States to broadcasting signals emanating from
any other Member State and the harmonization of European Union broadcast
advertising standards. The directive contains chapters devoted to promotion of
television program production and distribution, protection of minors, television
advertising and sponsorship, and right of reply.
The TWF Directive (89/552/EEC, as amended by Directive 97/36/EC) al-
lows 9 minutes of commercials in average, with a maximum of 12 minutes in
any given hour. Some member states have stricter limits. For example, in
France, all broadcast channels must carry at most 6 minutes of commercials on
average, with a maximum of 12 minutes in any given hour. The exception is the
Franco-German venture ARTE, which is restricted to 4 minutes of commercials
on average, and a maximum of 9 minutes in any given hour. Cable television
is only governed by the EU standard.
In the UK, no advertising is allowed on public television (the BBC). The
average viewer time in Great Britain is 225 minutes per day, and 41% of the
viewers of broadcast television and 28% of satellite viewers watch the BBC.
Commercial broadcasting is allowed no more than nine minutes per hour av-
erage per day, with a maximum of 12 minutes in any given hour, in accord
with European laws. However, there can be no more than seven and a half
minutes on average in prime time viewing. Cable television is also regulated
by the EU standard. Ads must fall in natural breaks in programming and be
at least 20 minutes apart. Ads are not allowed to interrupt certain types of
programs such as religious ceremonies, royal ceremonies, or programs including
members of the royal family, parliamentary broadcast, and scholastic and chil-
dren’s programs. Excluded sectors are political ads, tobacco, betting, private
detective agencies, weapons, pornography, prescription medicine, and products
7that mask the eﬀects of alcohol. Some restrictions are applied to religious mes-
sages, those soliciting donations, marital agencies, alcohol, ﬁnancial messages,
food products, betting, and medicines. It is understood that spirits should
not be advertised. There are also speciﬁc rules that forbid subliminal ads and
comparative ads are only authorized under reservations. The sound volume of
ads should not be louder than the surrounding programming.
In the Netherlands, the overall law for time limits conforms with the EU di-
rective of 20% per hour but in practice, the Dutch minister sets a much tighter
limit of 6.5% of daily programming for the public television stations. Ad-
vertisement spots are in blocks of at least 2 minutes and must only occur in
natural breaks. Excluded sectors include tobacco, prescription drugs, or ideo-
logical messages. Alcohol is allowed to be advertised, but with a three second
educational slogan such as “drink but moderately”, “Stay sociable. Drink mod-
erately”, “Let’s stay sociable and drink with moderation”. The Dutch also have
several regulations designed for the protection of children, and there should be
no pressure for children under 12 to buy products and children’s inexperience
and credulity should not be abused. For candy ads, a pictogram of toothbrush
and toothpaste is featured prominently.
Sweden has one of the highest percentages of TV household ownership at
97%, and the average viewing time in Sweden is 140 minutes per person per day.
Half of the viewers of broadcast television are equally split between two public
televisions (SVT1 and SVT2). These stations are not allowed to advertise. For
other stations, the time allowed for advertisements is eight minutes maximum in
any given hour, rising to ten minutes between 7 p.m. and midnight. However,
ads may only take up an average of six minutes per hour over the whole day,
and six minutes per hour from 6 p.m. to midnight. Ads must fall in natural
breaks in programming (such as halftime in football matches) and they must
be at least twenty minutes apart. Advertising spots must be clearly identiﬁed
in terms of beginning and end points. Products which are excluded from
advertising are alcohol, tobacco, and prescription medicine. Sweden has the
strictest regulations concerning children.10 Indeed, no advertisement may be
directed primarily to children under 12 years old, there can be no advertising
before and after children’s programs and presenters of children’s programs must
not feature in any adverts.
Outside the EU, in Norway, a broadcaster is now allowed to interrupt a
programme with advertising breaks to a larger extent than previously.11 The
rules are quite complicated. For example, a ﬁctional series like “Friends” could
not be interrupted under the old rules. It may now be interrupted once, with
a commercial break lasting at most 60 seconds.
10Sweden voted against the regulations promoted by the European community because it
felt that they were not strict enough.
11I thank Tore Nilssen for this information. The Norwegian regulations were last
amended in July 2004. The “old” Norwegian regulations (the English version has
not been updated since 1998) on broadcasting, including advertising, can be found at
http://www.odin.dep.no/kkd/engelsk/acts_regulations/018001-990111/index-dok000-b
83 A model of advertising caps
Commercial (or free to air) television exists because of advertising revenues.
Advertising caps might therefore substantially alter the performance of the
industry. As well as having a direct eﬀect on reducing nuisance to viewers
and curtailing information ﬂows from ﬁrms to prospective purchasers, caps may
change both the types of programs, the quality of programming, and the variety
of programs oﬀered. To understand how advertising caps may aﬀect broadcast
ﬁrms’ incentives (and the ensuing equilibrium), we need to carefully describe
the structure of competition within the industry. The broadcast industry has
a very interesting economic structure quite diﬀerent from the industrial organi-
zation of most markets for consumer goods. The basic business model is that
broadcasts are used as entertainment for viewers and these broadcasts also carry
advertisements. Viewers are then exposed to advertisements as a side product
of their consumption of the entertainment content. The entertainment content
is paid for by advertisers who use the intermediary of the broadcast company
to deliver messages to the advertising ﬁrms’ prospective customers. This setup
may be described as a two-sided market with network externalities.12 In this
vein, we may view the intermediary, the broadcast company, as a “platform”
that needs to get both sides on board in order to generate revenues. That
is, the broadcaster must deliver viewers to advertisers and does so by judicious
choice of the level (and perhaps the type) of advertising it proposes along with
an attractive enough vehicle to entice the prospective buyers of the advertisers
products to watch. Competition with other broadcasters (other platforms), is
also an important feature of the competitive landscape. A broadcaster needs to
take into account the extent to which increasing the number of advertisements
shown will cause viewers to switch oﬀ or switch channels, and this decision also
impacts the amount of revenue raised per viewer from the advertisers.
A careful description and construction of a model of platform competition in
two-sided markets therefore requires that we describe the behavior of the three
types of agent who interact on the platform. We ﬁrst describe advertisers, then
viewers, then the broadcaster that bring the two together.
3.1 Advertisers
Advertisers wish to communicate with viewers who are the prospective con-
sumers of the wares they advertise. We describe the advertiser side of the
market by their willingness to pay to communicate. We shall abstract from
various well-established features of advertising. First, marketers recognize that
a viewer typically needs to see an advertisement at least two or three times
before there is any marked change in her awareness of the good being adver-
tised. Thereafter the beneﬁt from “hitting” a particular consumer with an ad
falls oﬀ quite rapidly after several exposures in a short time frame. Instead,
it is assumed here that a single “hit” suﬃc e st or e a c hav i e w e r . S e c o n d ,w e
12For more on such two-sided markets, see Armstrong (2004), Caillaud and Jullien (2001
and 2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003 and 2004), and Wright (2003).
9also abstract from the time dimension. In particular, by assuming that there
is a single viewing period, we circumvent the issue that a broadcaster may be
able to deliver to an advertiser in one time slot a viewer who was delivered by a
diﬀerent broadcaster in another time slot. Third, we shall furthermore assume
that all viewers are homogenous to advertisers so that there is no matching of
advertisements to programs (golf clubs in a golﬁng program). Fourth, we shall
assume also that the demand for advertising time by a particular advertiser is
a simple linear function of the number of viewers delivered. This means that if
an ad delivers twice as many viewers as another, then the advertiser is willing
to pay twice as much in order to air the ad before the higher group size.
Let the demand price per viewer when a adverts are aired be given by p(a).
Thus if a broadcaster delivers Ni viewers and airs ai advertisements, the broad-
caster’s advertising revenue is Nip(ai)ai. It will be convenient in what follows
to write R(ai)=p(ai)ai,a st h er e v e n u ee a r n e do nap e rv i e w e rb a s i sw h e nai
advertisements are screened. We shall assume that R(.) is log-concave meaning
that lnR is concave. This in turn implies that the ratio R0/R is a decreasing
function. This means that the revenue function has the standard hump shape,
although it does not necessarily have to be strictly concave.
3.2 Viewers
We assume that viewers react to the full price, fi, associated to viewing option
i. This full price may be decomposed into advertising nuisance, which we
assume to be a linear function of the number of adverts watched, and any direct
monetary subscription price for watching television, if applicable. That is,
fi = γai + si,
where γ is the nuisance cost imposed per ad, ai is the number of ads screened
on channel i and si is its subscription price. Viewers choose which channel
to watch according to a discrete choice model: viewers choose to watch the
program that yields the highest utility. The conditional utility to a viewer
from watching channel i is depends on the match value of the option minus the
full price paid:
ui = εi − [si + γai],
where the term in square brackets is the full price, fi,a n dεi is the idiosyncratic
evaluation of the consumer for the particular viewing option. Viewers all dislike
ads to the same degree.13 In the sequel, this idiosyncratic beneﬁtm a yb e
visualized as a distance function (as in models based in spatial economics) or
else a random draw from a taste distribution as in standard discrete choice
models.
13We might also deduct from the full price any expected surplus the consumer expects from
buying products showcased in the ads seen. Such surplus (loosely) reduces the eﬀective γ,
and may even make it negative. Infomercials may constitute an example of negative γ insofar
as some consumers actively watch to garner information about such goods as exercise bikes.
Such advertising provides a positive net beneﬁt rather than a loss.
10Denote by Ni (fi,f −i) the number of viewers in the population who choose to
watch channel i where f−i denotes the vector of full prices of other stations. We
shall frequently invoke the assumption of fully covered markets, which means
that each viewer selects one of the n available stations to watch. Let N0
i < 0
denote the derivative of the own viewer share with respect to own full price
and we will use the notation N0 to describe the derivative under a symmetric
market situation. Thus, for example, the derivative ∂Ni
∂ai , when evaluated at a
symmetric solution, will be written as simply γN0.
3.3 Broadcasters
There are n broadcasters in the market and they are each individually assumed
to maximize proﬁts. These proﬁts are given by the product of the number of
viewers and the total revenues earned per viewer. The revenues per viewer
potentially comprise two terms, the subscription price and the advertising rev-
enues. Thus
πi = Ni (fi,f −i)[si + R(ai)].
First consider the case of a monopolist which chooses only its advertising
level (we refrain from considering subscription prices for the moment). The
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Since N0
i is negative then marginal revenue, R0 (ai), is necessarily positive at
any interior solution. This means that the monopolist reins back advertising









The left-hand side is strictly decreasing under the assumption that R is log-
concave, and the right-hand side is increasing in the advertising level under
a similar assumption on the demand function, Ni (fi).T h e o p t i m a l c h o i c e
is then visualized as a familiar-looking intersection (with the quantity of ads
on the horizontal axis) of a downward-sloping curve with an upward sloping
one. The eﬀect of an increase in γ is then seen to be that the upward sloping
curve shifts up, and so the chosen advertising level must fall. This is because a
higher γ corresponds to a higher nuisance value from advertising and so a higher
loss rate from raising the number of ads. Put another way, individual viewer
demand becomes more elastic in advertising, and so the advertising“price” paid
by viewers falls.
For the welfare analysis that follows, we must consider the surpluses accruing
to three types of agent in the model.14 We therefore sum the broadcasters’
14The following draws on Anderson and Coate (2004). Other authors who have addressed
welfare issues include Crampes, Haritchabalet, and Jullien (2004), Dukes (2004), Hansen and
Kyhl (2001), Kind, Nilssen, and Sorgaard (2004), and Stegeman (2004).
11proﬁts, the advertisers’ surplus, and the viewers’ entertainment beneﬁts. Note
that the advertising revenue component of the broadcasters’ proﬁti ss i m p l y
the revenue under the advertising demand curve, so that the total surplus from
advertising is measured simply as the full area below the advertising demand
curve. In the case of a fully covered market (i.e., if all viewers watch), the
analysis is also simpliﬁed because subscription prices are simply a transfer from
viewers to broadcast ﬁrms and the subscription price level is therefore revenue
neutral and plays no role in the overall welfare analysis. It is, however, crucial
in determining the distributional eﬀects of any policy change.
Now consider the optimal level of advertising when there is a single broadcast
channel. If the market is fully covered, then the optimal level of advertising stip-
ulates simply that the marginal cost of advertising equals the marginal beneﬁt
of advertising. With fully covered markets, the marginal cost is just the nui-
sance to viewers, γ (this insight carries over to the analysis of several broadcast
channels which follows). The marginal social beneﬁt is the per advertisement
per viewer demand price, p, and so the social optimum stipulates the equality of
advertising nuisance and demand price per viewer. In the case of markets that
are not fully covered (so that there is some leakage to the non-viewing option
at the margin) the marginal social cost of advertising must be augmented by
the lost surplus caused by inducing another viewer to switch oﬀ.T h i s l o s t
surplus consists of the advertiser beneﬁts that no longer accrue on account of
that viewer.
We can now compare the optimal level of advertising with the equilibrium
level for the monopoly as described above. From this comparison we can de-
termine whether (binding) advertising caps have beneﬁcial or detrimental social
consequences. Notice ﬁrst that if the advertising nuisance, γ, is very low then
the monopolist’s optimal choice of advertising will be where marginal revenue is
practically zero. This is because the monopolist holds back advertising levels in
order to extract the maximum revenue per viewer from the advertising market.
However the social optimum, in the case of negligible nuisance costs to viewers,
stipulates that all advertisers with positive demand prices ought to be allowed
access to the viewers (who anyway do not view the adverts as an intrusion in
this particular benchmark case). This clearly implies that the market equilib-
rium level of advertising is below the optimal level — in the same manner that
a monopolist’s output is below the competitive output. Any advertising cap in
such a situation would just exacerbate the market failure because a binding cap
must be less than the monopolist’s advertising choice and therefore even further
from the socially optimal level of advertising.
Consider now the opposite scenario where the advertising nuisance per ad-
vertisement is high. Indeed, this nuisance can be higher than the demand price
of the advertiser with the highest willingness to pay to reach viewers (prospec-
tive consumers). In this case the socially optimal level of advertisements is zero
because no consumer ought to be disturbed by an ad that returns to its sender
less beneﬁtt h a ni ti n ﬂicts on the unfortunate viewer whose entertainment is
disturbed by it. However, the market equilibrium must always involve a pos-
itive level of advertising. Even though this level of advertising falls with the
12nuisance cost to viewers (because the higher the advertising cost, then the larger
propensity for viewers to turn oﬀ, a situation the monopolist guards against),
this level of advertising must always be positive. This is because, in the absence
of the ability (or the technology) to use subscription pricing, the only source
of revenue for a free to air broadcaster is revenue from advertising. In this
scenario the market level of advertising is necessarily too high. Any ad cap
will then improve social welfare by drawing down the level of advertising by the
monopolist to closer to the socially optimal level. Notice that there are strong
distributional consequences to such an advertising cap. The broadcaster’s prof-
its fall (because marginal revenue is positive in the neighborhood of its choice);
viewers’ utility rises since they suﬀer less nuisance from ads; and advertisers’
surplus necessarily falls as the reduced level of advertising implies a higher price
per ad per viewer and correspondingly less producer surpluses for the advertis-
ers. Some care is needed with the provisional conclusion that welfare rises from
such an ad level restriction. The fact that broadcast proﬁts have fallen will
mean, in the broader context of several ﬁrms, that some ﬁrms may no longer
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter and serve the market. Viewers would then suﬀer an
additional loss from reduced variety of television oﬀerings. Secondly, even with
a ﬁxed number of broadcast ﬁrms in the market, the change in proﬁti n c e n t i v e s
induced by the advertising cap may in turn change the quality and the type of
programming oﬀered. We turn to these themes below.
3.4 Quality
We now address how the presence of advertising caps may aﬀect the quality
provision of television programming in the market place. The presence of
binding advertising caps aﬀects the revenue earned per consumer reached and so
aﬀects the incentive to provide quality. For simplicity, we consider a monopoly.
Let the utility of a consumer be given by
u = q − γa− tx,
if the consumer watches television, and zero otherwise. Here q denotes quality
of the program and the ﬁrm may be viewed as locating at zero; and t is the
disutility cost faced by viewers per unit distance away from the ideal type, x.15





and the monopolist viewership is given by
N =2 φˆ x,
15The term “quality” is meant in the sense of a positive shift in demand for viewing. This
may not necessarily be synonymous with a higher art form. “Higher quality” could well be
Howard Stern or “Friends” over a BBC documentary or a Shakespearean drama!
13where φ is the consumer density, and the 2 simply represents the fact that the
monopoly serves consumers in both directions away from its own location. The
monopolist’s proﬁt is therefore given by
π =2 φˆ xR(a) − C (q).
First consider the monopoly solution in the absence of any restriction on adver-

















These ﬁrst order conditions show how advertising levels and quality are related.
In particular, a higher consumer density φ will entail a higher quality provision
because of economies to scale in providing quality that the television program
is eﬀectively a public good.










and the conditions may be combined to give 2φˆ xR0 (a)=γC0 (q).
Now consider the eﬀects of an advertising cap set at level ¯ a. Then the ﬁrm’s
proﬁti s
π =2 φˆ xR(¯ a) − C (q),







This shows that a lower advertising cap will cause the monopolist’s quality
choice to be smaller. The social eﬀects of this cap depend on both whether
advertising was previously over-provided and whether quality was over-provided
or under-provided. In particular, the monopolist’s quality choice depends upon
the extra revenue that may be extracted from the marginal viewer, while the
socially optimal level of quality depends upon the improvement in average total
surplus from further quality.
The social welfare function for this problem comprises three component
parts, for viewers, broadcasters, and advertisers. The viewer surplus is the
average surplus of (q − γa− tˆ x/2) over the 2φˆ x viewers served. The proﬁti s
16If the advertising demand is linear, p(a)=α − ba, and the cost of providing quality is
quadratic, C(q)=
q2
2 , then the problem is not concave. Care must be exercised in such
problems with quality ﬁxed costs if there is insuﬃcient curvature to marginal quality.
142φˆ xR(a)−C (q) , and advertiser surplus is 2φˆ x
©R a
0 p(˜ a)d˜ a − R(a)
ª
.T h el a s t
term represents the number of viewers reached times the advertisers’ surplus per
viewer. Note that the revenue per viewer is simply a transfer from advertisers
to the broadcaster. We can then write the welfare function as
W =2 φˆ x
½






where ˆ x =
q−γa
t . Denote the term in brackets by Ω, which is therefore the
surplus per consumer.
It is a useful point of reference to derive the full optimum for this model.




Ω − C0 (q)=0 .
This indicates that, like the equilibrium, the optimum quality choice is increas-
ing in the consumer density. The ﬁxed cost of quality is then spread over a larger
consumer base, and so the quality will be higher. Such a result also underscores
the empirical ﬁndings of Berry and Waldfogel (2001) for newspapers, and is in
turn based on insights in Sutton (1991) and Shaked and Sutton (1987).





Ω +2 φˆ xp(a)=0 ,
and so reduces to




The left-hand side of this expression represents the positive divergence between
demand price and nuisance cost, which is caused by the rate of turn-oﬀ of viewers
and the consequent surplus lost on that account, as represented on the right side.
An alternative interpretation (Anderson and Coate, 2004) is to view
γ
tˆ xΩ as an
additional term (on top of the direct nuisance term, γ) in the marginal cost of




The next issue to consider is the eﬀect of a cap on advertising levels. Clearly,
the monopolist is worse oﬀ through being constrained. Moreover, the monop-
olist provides a lower program quality because the cap reduces its incentives to
attract viewers. A priori, it is unclear whether viewers are better oﬀ (because
they suﬀer less nuisance from commercials) or worse oﬀ from the lower program
quality. The next example gives a case where viewers are always worse oﬀ with
at i g h t e rc a p .
Suppose that the demand for ads per viewer by advertisers is perfectly elastic
at rate β per ad per viewer. This implies that the revenue function is R(a)=βa.
The monopolist’s choice of advertising for a given quality is from the advertising
ﬁrst order condition above as
a = q/2γ. (1)
15Suppose further that the cost of quality provision is given by C (q)=q3/3.
Then the proﬁt derivative with respect to quality, q,i s
2φβa
t −q2. This implies







Combining these last two equations indicates that the unconstrained monopoly
solution is to set quality at qm =
φβ
tγ , and to set advertising at am = 1
2γ.17 It is
useful for what follows to further note that the marginal proﬁt from increasing
the advertising level, given a starting level of advertising ¯ a,g i v e nt h a tt h eﬁrm
is choosing its quality to maximize proﬁts, is proportional to
q
2φβ¯ a
t −2γ¯ a.T h e













the consumer surplus varies with the advertising cap, ¯ a, according to
dCS
d¯ a







Now, as long as the cap is binding: that is,
q
2φβ¯ a
t > 2γ¯ a, as noted above,
then this expression is necessarily positive. Hence, consumer surplus necessarily
rises with a cap. Put diﬀerently, a more binding cap necessarily hurts consumers
because the downgrading the broadcaster makes to quality more than oﬀsets the
direct beneﬁt to reduced nuisance from advertisements themselves. Since the
monopolist itself is worse oﬀ with a more binding cap, then a cap is welfare
deteriorating for all involved. Thus tighter advertising caps make all market
players worse oﬀ.
We now address the generality of these properties. Let N (γa− q) denote
the demand (number of viewers) for the monopolist’s program, as a function of
the full price, γa− q. Assume that the monopoly problem
max
{a,q}
R(a)N (γa− q) − C (q)
has an interior solution.
If there is an advertising cap at some level, ¯ a, below the monopoly’s preferred
choice, then it satisﬁes
R0 (¯ a)N (γ¯ a − q)+γR(¯ a)N0 (γ¯ a − q) > 0. (3)
17The second order conditions hold at this solution.
16The ﬁrst order condition for quality choice at level q∗ is
−R(¯ a)N0 (γ¯ a − q∗) − C0 (q∗)=0
(where the ﬁrst term is positive since N0 (γ¯ a − q∗) < 0).
Applying the implicit function theorem, this tells us that the quality choice




R0 (¯ a)N0 (γ¯ a − q∗)+γR(¯ a)N”(γ¯ a − q∗)
(R(¯ a)N”(γ¯ a − q∗) − C”(q∗))
(4)
where we assume the denominator is negative from the second order condition
for a maximum to the quality choice problem. If N” ≤ 0, then the numerator
is necessarily negative, so that a concave demand function implies that quality
falls as the cap gets tighter. Otherwise, consider the following argument. From
the binding ad cap condition, (3), we have that
γR(¯ a) < −R0 (¯ a)
N (γ¯ a − q)
N0 (γ¯ a − q)
,
and hence (considering the numerator of (4)) that




for N”(γ¯ a − q∗) > 0.N o w , s i n c e R0 (¯ a) > 0, the R.H.S. of this expression is
necessarily negative if N (.) is strictly log-concave ((N0)
2 − N”N ≥ 0). Hence
the L.H.S. is also negative and so
∂q∗
∂¯ a > 0. The intuition for this condition is
that an ad cap reduces the revenue yield per viewer delivered to advertisers, and
so the broadcaster’s marginal beneﬁt is lower than without an ad cap. This
leads to lower provision of quality. It is also straightforward to ﬁnd conditions
under which
∂q∗
∂¯ a < 0. For example, if unconstrained, the monopoly advertising
ﬁrst-order condition (3) holds with equality. This implies that, for a binding
cap in the neighborhood of the unconstrained monopoly optimum, quality is
unchanged for a log-linear demand, and it actually rises with a tighter cap if the
viewer demand is more "convex" than log-linear (i.e., strict log-convexity, but
not more than (-1)-concavity since otherwise the second order conditions may
be violated). In such cases, viewer surplus necessarily rises as the cap tightens
(locally).
This latter case of log-convex demand and a cap in the neighborhood of the
unconstrained solution is also interesting because quality rises with a (slightly)
tighter cap, so viewer surplus does too. Indeed, from the demand function,
N (γ¯ a − q∗), a lower full price, γ¯ a − q∗, will mean higher surplus per viewer
(and also a higher equilibrium number of viewers) so that viewer surplus rises
with the level of the ad cap (equivalently, the tighter the cap, the lower the
viewer surplus). Moreover, a tighter cap also is a tighter constraint on the
broadcaster’s actions and so decreases proﬁt, but in the neighborhood of a non-
binding cap, this eﬀect is second-order small. The total welfare eﬀect is therefore
that welfare rises with a slightly tighter cap.
17In summary, if demand is “convex” enough, both viewer surplus and total
welfare may rise with a tighter ad cap. Otherwise, the quality reduction result-
ing from a cap oﬀsets the direct viewer gain. If the quality reduction outweighs
the direct eﬀect (as was shown in the linear demand example), then tighter caps
reduce the surplus of all market participants.
3.5 Product Selection and Advertising Caps
Advertising caps may also aﬀect the breadth of products oﬀered in a equilibrium.
The basic insight follows from Gabszewicz, Laussel, Sonnac (2004). To see
this, consider a simple sketch of duopoly product selection along the lines of
the well-trodden framework pioneered by Hotelling (1929). In the simplest
version of the model (see Lerner and Singer, 1937, and Eaton and Lipsey, 1975),
ﬁrms simply compete by choosing locations (program formats in the current
context) in order to maximize the number of viewers. Such would be the
relevant behavioral assumption when ﬁrms are constrained by an advertising
cap, or indeed if viewers face no nuisance cost from the presence cost of the
advertising and advertising was ﬁxed from the demand side. This setup is
then the classic “ice-cream sellers’ problem” with two ﬁrms striving to sell to
the most consumers. The (unique) equilibrium is that both ﬁrms choose the
central location in the market, a situation described by Boulding (1955) as the
“Principle of Minimum Diﬀerentiation.” Any location of one ﬁrm away from the
center would induce the other to locate right next to it on the longer side of
market. Notice for the later development that, as long as ﬁrms are constrained
by ad caps, each wants to move in closer to its rival. This is because the market
served by a ﬁrm is determined by the midpoint between its own location and
that of its rival, and so is increasing as the ﬁrm moves closer to its rival (leaving
aside for the moment the possibility of jumping over its rival location).
Now consider the ingredient to this model, namely the version of the Hotelling
model written down by d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979). This
model, as did Hotelling, considers a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which two
competing ﬁrms are to choose locations on the unit segment, following which
they both rationally anticipate the sub-game equilibrium choice of prices that
e n s u e sf r o mt h el o c a t i o nc h o s e ni nt h eﬁrst stage of the game. The diﬀer-
ence introduces by these authors over the original Hotelling speciﬁcation was
to specify transportation as a quadratic function of distance, as opposed to
Hotelling’s original linear speciﬁcation. D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse
(1979) show that the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium involves the ﬁrms lo-
cating at the extreme points of the unit interval.18 This outcome results from
the balance of two opposing forces that apply to the pricing sub-game. First,
18This maximal diﬀerentiation result relies on the restriction that the locations are con-
strained to lie within the unit interval. There does not seem any technological reason why
indeed the support of the product speciﬁcation must necessarily be the same as the support
as the consumer taste distribution. Relaxing this restriction and instead allowing the ﬁrms to
locate anywhere on the real line gives instead the equilbrium locations as -1/4 and 5/4, which
means that ﬁrms do locate far apart but not as far apart as might be physically possible. See
Anderson (1988) for further details.
18ceteris paribus,m o v i n gc l o s e rt oo n e ’ sr i v a lt r i g g e r sam o r ea c u t el e v e lo fp r i c e
competition, in particular a lower rival’s price, which a ﬁrm strives to avoid by
locating far away. However, as we argued above in the ﬁxed price version of the
model, locating closer to the rival also gives the ﬁrm a higher market share. In
the version of the model with quadratic transportation costs, the former eﬀect
dominates throughout the location on the unit integral leading to the maximal
diﬀerentiation result.
We now show how to translate this location result into the context of the
advertising framework. Suppose that the demand for ads is perfectly elastic,
and each advertiser is willing to pay β in order for their advertisement to be
seen by a prospective consumer (television viewer). Assume to that the number
of viewers attracted to the station depends linearly on the nuisance on the
advertising, and indeed that we may write the utility of a viewer at location
x ∈ [0,1] is
ui = y − γai − t|x − xi|2,i =1 ,2,
where y is consumer income (for simplicity the same for all consumers), xi is
the location of product i,a n dt is the transportation rate per unit distance.
The demand addressed to ﬁrm i, Ni, is then determined by the measure of
consumers for whom ui exceeds uj, i 6= j. T h i si se x a c t l yt h es a m ev i e w e r
demand equation as in the standard spatial formulation. The proﬁtt oﬁrm i
c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na s
πi = βaiNi,
which is exactly the same (up to a multiplicative constant) as the formulation
of d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), with ai replacing the standard
price pi. Therefore, the maximum diﬀerentiation result holds under this speci-
ﬁcation that is ﬁrms avoid intensive advertising competition by locating as far
apart as possible. They still would like to come closer to increase unilateral
market share, but refrain from doing so to keep advertising levels, and hence
advertising revenues, as high as is possible under Bertrand-Nash advertising
competition.
We now allow for advertising caps in the framework sketched out above.
First note that, as a function of symmetric locations, the sub-game equilibrium
advertising levels are greatest the further apart are the ﬁrms. This means that
an advertising cap, if set below the level that attains at maximally diﬀerentiated
locations, will necessarily be locally binding on both ﬁrms. Consequently,
under such a binding cap ﬁrms will ﬁnd their proﬁts locally increasing as long
as the cap is binding, as they move in toward each other, following the logic
of the ﬁxed price model. However, at some point the cap must necessarily
be reached since the equilibrium advertising level falls continuously to zero at
the point of minimal diﬀerentiation (when ﬁrms locate together then they are
indistinguishable and there is not product diﬀerentiation so that competition a
la Bertrand with homogenous products and price goes to the competitive level,
namely zero.) As soon as the cap is reached, the ﬁrms clearly wish to go no
further together from the logic of the model with endogenous advertising levels
expounded above.
19T h el e s s o nf r o mt h i ss i m p l es k e t c hi sﬁrst of all, that advertising caps may
have an impact on product selection and the existence of caps may increase the
proclivity of ﬁrms to produce similar programming. Indeed, the seminal analy-
sis of Steiner (1952) suggests that duplication may be a prevalent problem in
television broadcast selection.19 His analysis though, relies on the assumption
that broadcasters aim to maximize the number of viewers, an assumption that
is only eﬀectively tenable if advertising levels are capped (or indeed if viewers
do not care about the level of advertising they consume) Nevertheless, some
care ought to be exercised in taking literally the result from the quadratic cost
model. In particular, this model always predicts that the free market equilib-
rium product selection is socially excessive (the optimal format choices being at
the quartiles). Other transportation cost functions, and hence the possibilities
of other outcomes prove remarkably diﬃcult to analyze in a tractable fashion
but there is no ap r i o r ipresumption that the equilibrium format choices would
necessarily lie outside the optimal ones as they do for the quadratic model.
Notice that the equilibrium in the presence of the advertising caps is at
the location at which the cap is binding. This means that the cap could be
judiciously set so as to induce equilibrium format choices at exactly the socially
optimal level.20
4 Content restrictions
The restrictions on the products that are not allowed to be advertised can
be understood by reference to the economics of externalities and government
paternalism. Perhaps surprisingly, banning or restricting advertising may also
increase industry proﬁts under some circumstances. This section explores these
themes along with the particular case of prescription drug advertising to con-
sumers.
4.1 Paternalistic altruism and merit goods
Cigarette advertising is widely banned - even sponsorship of motor-racing by
cigarette ﬁrms was recently illegal in Belgium, for example. Goods that impart
negative externalities on others (e.g., second-hand smoke eﬀects) can tradition-
ally be treated with Pigouvian taxes on their consumption, and/or direct quan-
tity regulations (banning smoking in bars, banning smoking by those under-age).
Alcohol also may be associated with negative externalities (drunk-driving, and
violent behavior towards others). Consumption of these goods is also often
viewed as addictive. Economists usually prefer taxation to outright bans in
cases of negative externalities: the preferences of individuals are respected al-
19See though Beebe (1977) for a contrary appraisal.
20However, the advertising level itself may be suboptimal. Under the current speciﬁcation,
in which consumers always watch one of the two channels and advertisers are willing to pay a
constant amount per viewer reached, the optimal level of advertising is zero if γ>β ,a n di s
inﬁnite if γ<β .
20beit under the modiﬁcation that the full price paid reﬂects all harm done to
others.
However, it may be that a consumer who is deterred from consumption may
not become addicted or may give up or reduce the habit, and may later be
thankful for having been induced to moderation. If people care about the con-
sumption levels of other individuals of such “dangerous” goods, they may sup-
port regulations or taxes. In the earlier literature, the concept of “merit goods”
(like education) corresponded to goods that were to be encouraged according
to an implicit governmental welfare function. Cigarettes, alcohol, gambling,
etc., fall in the opposite category of demerit goods that are to be discouraged.
The encouragement or discouragement reﬂects paternalism by the Government
or, indeed, on behalf of the individuals who elect the Government to act on
their behalf. Why then are bans used instead of further taxes? Instead of ban-
ning cigarette advertising, taxes could be levied on advertising tobacco products,
and/or the product could itself be taxed still more. Perhaps the decision by the
authorities is made without full consideration of the range of available options
for reducing consumption; and the symbolism may be more signiﬁcant with a
ban than with a higher tax (where, after all, one might suspect the Government
of wanting higher consumption to raise more revenue). It may be viewed as in-
herently rather contradictory for the product’s makers to be persuading people
to smoke on the one hand (and the Government collecting revenues from that
activity), and the Government on the other hand spending money persuading
them not to smoke.
4.2 The eﬀects of an advertising ban on industry proﬁts
Banning advertising of some products also has direct economic consequences in
the industries aﬀected. The Economics of Advertising traditionally separates
informative advertising from forms of persuasion. If the prime role of the ad-
vertising is informative (telling people where and how to buy the product, and
informing them of new products) then a ban in advertising through some chan-
nels (cigarettes may still be advertised in magazines in the U.S., for example)
may be analyzed rather like an increase in the costs of advertising. Then, some
surprising results by Grossman and Shapiro (1984) suggest that oligopolists
might actually see their proﬁts rise as costs rise.21 This is because prices rise
substantially after the reduced level of information transmitted in equilibrium
decreases the overlap of informed consumers and so reduces competition. An-
other form of informative advertising, sometimes attributed to many television
advertisements, is quality signalling (see e.g., Nelson, 1974, and Milgrom and
Roberts, 1986). Eliminating this role for advertising could either cause ﬁrms
to switch to other forms of signalling (product price reductions, or sponsorship
of sporting events, perhaps) or else could shut down signalling completely. In
the latter case, one would expect it very diﬃcult to launch new products: in
21See also the discussion in Tirole (1988) for a simple exposition of their model. Bagwell
(2002) provides a ﬁne survey of the overall Economics of Advertising.
21such industries one might expect only mature brands without new ones being
contemplated.
Some advertising is sometimes proﬀered as an example of a zero-sum game.
Insofar as cigarette advertising only serves to reshuﬄe consumers without corre-
sponding new consumers being drawn in, then all advertising expenditures are
“wasted” and ﬁrms’ proﬁts would be higher if the Government would do them all
a favor by eliminating what they cannot avoid competing over, and ban adver-
tising completely. The welfare economics of persuasive advertising are already
quite controversial (even before we get to demerit goods!) because, aside from
the informative context where it is clear how to proceed with evaluating the
eﬀects of more information (through advertising), there is not much agreement
of whether or how advertising aﬀects tastes. For economists in the Chicago
tradition (Stigler and Becker, 1977, and Becker and Murphy, 1993) tastes are
fundamental and advertising can be viewed as contributing a complementary
consumption enjoyment. Banning advertising would close this down: although
it is still a reasonable question to ask if closing down a device that promotes
"smoking is cool" could possibly be viewed as a cause for concern! Lastly, Dixit
and Norman (1979) take an agnostic stand on whether the right welfare mea-
sure to evaluate quantity changes induced by advertising is to be based on the
demand before or after the advertising. Insofar as they claim that advertising
is already excessive without social preferences over goods, then, in the context
of demerit goods, reducing advertising (by banning TV advertising, say) must
presumably be beneﬁcial.
4.3 Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) Prescription Drug Adver-
tising
Advertising of prescription drugs directly to consumers is prohibited all over the
world except for the United States and New Zealand. In U.S., the Wheeler-Lea
Act 1938 granted the FTC jurisdiction over all drug advertising.22 However, in
1962, authority over prescription drug advertising was transferred to the FDA
(Federal Drug Administration) while the FTC retained regulatory authority over
over-the-counter (OTC) drug advertising. According to the FDA regulations on
prescription drug advertising, the advertisement must comply with two major
requirements. First, the ad must include a “brief summary”, which includes
providing the drug’s side eﬀects, contra-indications, warnings and precautions
and the indications for use. Second, the ad must comply with the “fair balance
doctrine”, meaning that the ad must provide a balanced account of all clinically
relevant information, the risks and the beneﬁts.
The FDA recognizes three diﬀerent types of prescription drug advertise-
ments, which are regulated diﬀerently. The ﬁrst category is “reminder adver-
tisements”, which call attention to the name of the drug product, but do not
include the speciﬁcation of the drug product. Second, help-seeking ads (or
disease oriented advertisements), which are generally broadcast with the head-
22I thank Jayani Jayawardhana for this material.
22ing “see your doctor”, describe the symptoms of a disease or condition, and
encourage consumers to consult their physician to discuss treatment options,
but do not mention the drug’s name. Finally, “product claim” (or “indication”
advertisements) reveal both the drug’s name and the indication. While prod-
uct claim ads are subject to brief summary requirement and the fair balance
doctrine, reminder advertisements and help-seeking advertisements are exempt
from the brief summary and fair balance requirements, as they do not reveal
information about the eﬀectiveness of a drug.
Although the brief summary requirement can be easily met by print adver-
tisements, it can be impractical for a broadcast advertisement (which normally
lasts for only about 30 seconds). In August 1997, the FDA issued the “Draft
guidance for industry, consumer-directed broadcast advertisements” allowing
sponsors of broadcast advertisements to make “adequate provision” of approved
product labeling (known as a major statement) instead of the brief summary.
After receiving the comments on the draft guidance, the ﬁnal guidance was
issued by the FDA in August 1999. The FDA requires that a broadcast ad
through media such as television, radio, or telephone communications systems
to disclose the product’s major risks in either the audio or visual parts of the
ad. This disclosure of risks is known as the “major statement”.23
This recent change in the FDA guidance on DTC advertising of prescription
drugs, introduced in 1997 and ﬁnalized in 1999, has opened the door to a ﬂood
of TV advertisements in the U.S. There are, of course, proponents on both
sides of the debate over whether the eﬀective legalization of TV advertising of
prescription drugs is socially desirable.
On one side, patients may be induced to clamor for drugs that are inappro-
priate for their conditions. At the same time, patients may be “persuaded” by
an advertisement that they have some condition that can be alleviated, which in
turn would increase the number of visits to the doctor, allowing for discussions
on the drug they are exposed to. This may be seen as undermining doctor’s au-
thority in prescription, and wasting her time on unnecessary discussions. Some
argue that due to these patients demand, doctors may over-prescribe, or pre-
scribe something costly or inappropriate, which in turn would bring negative
eﬀects on the patient.
On the other hand, DTC ads may be seen as an information source that
informs the consumer about new drugs and treatments for various conditions,
hence increasing the number of visits to the doctor. If the consumer was di-
agnosed with a condition and was prescribed a medically justiﬁed treatment, it
could be welfare improving as many diseases are under diagnosed. DTC ads can
23The adequate provision requirements include: 1) Disclosure in the advertisement of
an operating toll-free telephone number, through which the consumer can choose to have
the labeling information mailed or have the labeling information read over the phone. 2)
Reference in the advertisement to an alternative mechanism, such as reference to a print
advertisement, to provide package labeling to consumers with restricted access to the Internet
or those who are uncomfortable actively requesting additional information. 3) Disclosure
in the advertisement of an Internet web page address that provides access to the package
labeling. 4) Disclosure in the advertisement that pharmacists, or healthcare providers, may
provide additional information.
23also increase the awareness of certain conditions and the available treatments
for these conditions among the consumers. This may help improve the com-
munication between the doctor and the patient, which in turn would help the
doctor to choose the best treatment choice for the patient.
Empirical results from the study conducted by Iizuka and Jin (2002) on pa-
tient and doctor behavior suggest that DTC advertising leads to a large increase
in outpatient visits but no impact on doctor’s choice of drug within a therapeutic
class.24 However, the study by Wosinska (2002) on the role of DTC advertising
and the cholesterol reducing drug demand suggests that DTC advertising has
as i g n i ﬁcant positive eﬀect on the demand of an individual brand for the drugs
that have preferential status with the insurer (are listed on the formulary). The
debate on what ought to be (not) advertised on TV will remain an active one.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The regulations on Commercial Length are broadly as follows. The EU directive
allows for 9 minutes of commercials on average, with a maximum of 12 minutes
in any given hour. In Australia, broadcast channels must carry at most 13
minutes of commercials on average, with a maximum of 15 minutes in any given
hour. As a matter of comparison, some programs on the major networks in the
United States have recorded advertising levels in excess of 20 minutes. The only
length restrictions in the United States concern advertisements during children’s
programs, where the rules allow 10.5 minutes an hour, which rises to 12 minutes
during week-days.
The economic analysis of commercial length restrictions (advertising caps)
should be sited in a full-ﬂedged two-sided market model of the broadcasting
sector. If the quality, number, and types of programs are all treated as constant,
the market equilibrium delivers too little advertising for low nuisance costs.
Conversely, it delivers too many advertising messages for high nuisance costs
to viewers. This constitutes the economic eﬃciency argument for regulatory
length restrictions. Careful structural empirical work of the two-sided market
structure in TV broadcasting can determine the crucial parameter values of
nuisance cost and advertiser beneﬁts.25 These values can then be used to see
if ad-caps are desired, and the appropriate level. However, because ad caps
reduce proﬁts, they may cause a reduction in the variety (number) of programs
provided. They may also decrease diﬀerentiation among existing program types,
and decrease the quality of programs (at least, if viewer demand is not “too”
convex). This means that empirical work needs to account for these other
performance dimensions too.
Turning now to Commercial Content Regulations, EU, US, and Australian
regulations are quite similar in the broader scheme of things. All prohibit ciga-
24Iizuki (2004) ﬁnds higher advertising for drugs that are new, of high quality, for under-
treated diseases, and in more concentrated industries. He argues that DTCA expands markets
but involves little business-stealing.
25See Rysman (2004) and Wilbur (2004).
24rette advertising, for example. There are typically restrictions ensuring ads are
not indecent (relative to current community standards), subliminal, or broadcast
at higher volume than surrounding programming. The general codes regard-
ing advertising are also applicable to TV advertising — for example, restrictions
that ads not be misleading are covered by FTC rules in the US. There are
some interesting anomalies in certain countries. For example, France prohibits
ads for tobacco, weapons, employment, prescription medicines, alcohol, literary
print, press, and movies (with some exceptions). In the UK, ads must not in-
terrupt religious ceremonies or programs in which members of the royal family
appear. In Sweden, no ads are allowed before children’s programs. In the
US and New Zealand, Direct To Consumer Advertising (DTCA) of prescription
drugs is allowed, but this is not permissible elsewhere.
The Advertising Content Restrictions observed in practice might be ascribed
in most cases to Paternalistic Altruism, and the goods so restricted could be
described as demerit goods. One issue is why such goods are not taxed more
directly. The answer perhaps lies in the limited horizons of the policy makers.
Banning TV commercials for certain products increases the costs of adver-
tising (or indeed eliminates it). When the product industry equilibrium involves
too much advertising (from the standpoint of the welfare accruing directly in the
industry), then raising advertising costs may reduce over-advertising. For de-
merit goods, this must be socially beneﬁcial. In the (“money-burning”) theory
of advertising to signal product quality, eliminating the possibility of signal-
ing might be expected to make it diﬃcult to successfully launch new brands.
It might then be expected that only mature brands survive (in the cigarette
industry, for example). Finally, prescription drugs advertising remains contro-
versial. On the one hand, it may be helpful in getting patients to go to doctors
to have the conditions properly diagnosed. On the other hand, doctors might
be deluged with hypochondriacs and respond by over-prescribing inappropriate
medicines.
There are many important future research directions for this subject. One
big gap in the theoretical literature is that public television is not modeled, and
most systems have a mixture of public and private broadcasting. Indeed, there
are frequently other ingredients in the mixture of broadcast oﬀerings, such as
pay television, that survive alongside the commercial broadcasters. While it
is reasonably straightforward to model a market environment with both pay
television and commercial television (see Anderson, 2003, for a mixed market
model, and Peitz and Valletti, 2005, for a model comparing the two “pure”
systems), a major challenge is to convincingly model the objectives of public
broadcasters. Only with a reasonable description of their objectives can we
proceed to determine the performance of the overall industry, and only then
will we get closer to the full economics of the desirability of advertising caps.
Careful empirical work will also be most useful in evaluating proper policy. For
example, some measure of the nuisance cost of ads to viewers is crucial. Work
by Wilbur (2005) gives some estimates from a structural empirical model of
the industry, taking full account of its two-sided nature. Wilbur is also able to
address the eﬀects on industry equilibria of devices (such as “TiVo”) that allow
25viewers to by-pass ads.
Another area for further research is the economics of advertising itself.
Themes and empirical regularities already described in the marketing literature
could be usefully brought into the mainstream of economics of the product.
While the welfare economics of informative advertising is quite well understood
conceptually (at least in terms of how to perform welfare analysis, although
perhaps not in terms of what information is contained in ads), other forms
of advertising (e.g., “persuasive” advertising) pose a greater challenge in de-
scribing beneﬁts and how they accrue. Since ads are crowded out by caps, it
especially important to determine the welfare costs and beneﬁts from advertis-
ing. Structural empirical work again can provide estimates for some important
magnitudes.
There are several messages here for students of Industrial Organization and
students of media economics. First, the economics of television requires a sepa-
rate analysis that speciﬁcally embodies its two-sided structure. Namely, adver-
tisers want to contact prospective customers, and do so by accessing a “plat-
form” (the broadcaster), which bundles together advertising that viewers dislike
with entertainment content that they do like. In this context, advertising caps
may have a direct beneﬁcial eﬀect on viewers, but they may have indirect eﬀects
given the business model: it may be that less variety is supported, and perhaps
lower quality of broadcasts. Second, understanding the other types of adver-
tising regulation means looking at categories of goods like merit and demerit
goods.
The message for policy-makers follows from the two above. Speciﬁcally,
media markets are diﬀerent because of their two-sided structure: the basic busi-
ness model is unlike that in traditional markets because advertising ﬁnances
programming content. There is no presumption that market forces should de-
liver excessive advertising, and careful empirical work is needed in evaluating
nuisance costs to viewers and the social desirability of ads. It should be recog-
nized that advertising ﬁnances the media, and curtailing it may reduce both
program quality and program variety by reducing the incentive to compete for
advertisers and reducing revenues overall. The surplus accruing to advertisers
is another part of the total beneﬁts created, and this is typically not included
in discussions of television regulation (or indeed, other policy aspects, such as
merger analysis), but ought to be. To do so properly means also taking into
account the possible divergence between the private and the social demand for
advertising. Structural empirical work can be helpful in measuring various costs
and beneﬁts.
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